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I. INTRODUCTION
Although the period of July 1, 1993 through July 1, 1994 was not as
eventful as the prior year in Florida construction law, there were several
decisions worthy of discussion which affect construction practitioners.
II. MINORITY AND DISADVANTAGED BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
In Advanced Barricades & Signing, Inc. v. State, Department of
Transportation,' the First District Court of Appeal held that the State
Department of Transportation ("DOT") has no obligation under statute or
rule to ensure that contractors do not wrongfully terminate their subcontrac-
tors.2  Approval by DOT of a substituted subcontractor is merely a
ministerial act.' As long as the subcontractor is a certified disadvantaged
business enterprise ("DBE") or, alternatively, that the contractor has made
a good faith effort to subcontract with another DBE, the DOT must approve
the substitution.4 Only where the subcontractor sought to prove that the
DOT acted fraudulently, arbitrarily, illegally, or dishonestly, might the
subcontractor have standing to seek administrative relief.'
In Charles E. Burkett & Associates, Inc. v. State, Department of
Transportation,6 the court upheld the validity of the DOT rules requiring
a minority or a woman business owner to have "technical capability, knowl-
edge, training, education, or experience required to make decisions in the
critical areas of operation[s]" in addition to being an owner, before a
business may be certified as a DBE.7 Given the social purpose of the
1. 632 So. 2d 704 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
2. Id. at 706.
3. Id. at 705.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. 637 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
7. Id. at 48.
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program, it would seem that the minority business owner is placed at the
disadvantage of being required to have the expertise, rather than being able
to simply hire others with expertise. However, the rules were determined
to be neither arbitrary nor capricious!s
III. PERMITS: DUE PROCESS-PROPERTY RIGHT
In Reserve, Ltd. v. Town of Longboat Key,9 the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals held that it was not a violation of procedural due process for the
town to revoke a building permit which was issued subject to a provision of
the Longboat Key Code which stated that a permit would be revoked if no
"substantial work" was accomplished in any thirty day period after
construction commenced.' The court concluded that the substantial work
standard was not unconstitutionally vague." The court further stated that
there is a constitutionally protected interest in a building permit where funds
had been expended in reliance upon the permit."
IV. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACT PROVISIONS
A. Indemnity (Hold Harmless) Clauses
In Winn Dixie Stores, Inc. v. D & J Construction Co., 3 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal upheld an indemnity agreement where the language
of the agreement clearly covered* the claim made.'4 In this case, a con-
struction company employee was injured while working on Winn Dixie's
premises. The construction worker slipped and fell in a puddle caused by
a leaking roof. The roof was not part of the construction company's work,
and the company was not at fault for the leak. However, the construction
company did have an indemnity agreement with Winn Dixie which covered:
[A]ny claim or loss arising in any manner out of the presence or
activity of [D & J] or any of our servants, agents, or employees or
representatives or out of the presence of such equipment when such
persons or equipment are on your premises for the purposes of
8. Id.
9. 17 F.3d 1374 (11th Cir. 1994).
10. Id. at 1378.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1380.
13. 633 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
14. Id. at 65.
1994]
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performing services... notwithstanding such accident or damage may
have been caused in whole or in part [by] negligence of you [Winn
Dixie] or any of your servants, agents or employees. 15
Based on this agreement, the court held that Winn Dixie was entitled to
indemnification from the contractor for the loss.' 6
B. Conditions Precedent
In HRS v. E.D.S. Federal Corp.,7 the First District Court of Appeal
held that where there is express agreement that the parties will pursue
disputes through administrative remedy, a suit for breach of contract before
pursuing the administrative remedy is subject to dismissal.' The contract
required claims to be submitted to the contracting officer for resolution.
Absent a showing of bias on the part of the contracting officer, suit before
submission to the contracting officer for decision was premature.' 9
C. Arbitration
In Medident Construction, Inc. v. Chappell,2" the question arose as to
whether the validity of a contract which contained an arbitration clause was
an arbitrable issue. The Third District Court of Appeal held that it was.2'
A contractor and a homeowner entered into a contract which contained an
arbitration clause providing that all disputes between the parties would be
submitted to arbitration before the American Arbitration Association. The
homeowner filed a complaint against the construction company seeking a
declaration of the parties' rights under the contract, compensatory and
punitive damages, and fees. The contractor's motion to compel arbitration,
under the contract clause, was denied by the trial court, and the contractor
appealed.22 The appellate court held that because an arbitration clause is
considered separate from the rest of the contract, it must be specifically and
15. Id. at 66.
16. Id.
17. 631 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
18. Id. at 357.
19. See id. at 356-57 (explaining that HRS was not biased); see also HRS v. Maximus,
Inc., 633 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (granting a motion to dismiss for breach
of contract because the contract's dispute resolution clause was the same as in E.D.S.).
20. 632 So. 2d 194 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
21. Id. at 195.
22. Id.
Vol. 19
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exclusively attacked in order for the court to try the issue.23 In this case,
the appellee/homeowner challenged the contract as a whole, not specifically
the arbitration clause. Therefore, the relief sought fell within the scope of
the arbitration clause and was determined to be arbitrable.24 Other cases
have held that the issue of the validity of the agreement containing the
arbitration clause was to be determined by the court prior to compelling
arbitration.25  One such case is Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Clarke,26
where the court held that a limitation of actions defense must be arbitrat-
ed.27 Where the arbitration award said that it was in full settlement of all
claims and counterclaims submitted, and the award did not include
prejudgment interest, the court in Nitram, Inc. v. Industrial Risk Insurers"
would not award prejudgment interest on the arbitration award from the time
of the award to the time of entry of judgment upon confirming the award.29
D. Scheduling/No Damage for Delay
In a rather definitive opinion, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has
determined that language in a contract allowing the contractee to modify the
progress schedule at its discretion makes delay and lost efficiency claims
extremely difficult for the contractor to establish.3" In Marriott v. Dasta
Construction Co., the owner had "complete discretion to adjust the schedule
as well as to demand that Dasta comply with such adjustments without
additionally compensating Dasta."3' In the face of such clauses as: 1) the
right to adjust the schedule; 2) time is of the essence; and 3) no damage for
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. See Bardinella Designs, Inc. v. Spirit Constr., Inc., 524 So. 2d 703, 704 (Fla. 4th
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (holding that arbitration should not be compelled where a party is
seeking declaratory judgment and the validity of a contract has not been determined); seealso
Caltagirone v School Bd. of Hemando County, 355 So. 2d 873, 875 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App.
1978) (affirming a restraining order halting arbitration until the court determined the contract
was valid).
26. 617 So. 2d 402 (Fla. 3d Dist. CL App. 1993).
27. Id. at 402; see also Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc., 629 So. 2d
898 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a statute of limitations defense should be
determined by the arbitrators, not the courts).
28. 8 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. D257 (M.D. July 7, 1994).
29. Id. at D258.
30. Marriott Corp. v. Dasta Constr. Co., 26 F.3d 1057 (11 th Cir. 1994).
31. Id. at 1066.
1994]
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delay, the court doomed the contractor's claims as being without merit under
the language of the contract.32
In discussing the contractor's attempt to avoid the no damage for delay
clause on the basis of active interference, the court determined that the
contractor's failure to request time extensions, a right to which it was
entitled under the contract, precluded the contractor's claims for delay,
impact, and lost efficiency. The court suggested that if the contractor had
requested extensions which were the result of the owner's fraud, active
interference, or concealment, the contractor would have had an arguable
position. Not having requested the time extensions was fatal to the
contractor's claims.
33
V. CONSTRUCTION CLAIMS
A. Licensing
In Alfred Karram I, Inc. v. Cantor,34 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that an architect who was not licensed was not entitled to a
construction lien, but could maintain an action for breach of contract due to
the nature of the work performed.35 In this case, the architectural firm
performed architectural and related services in designing a single-family
home, although the firm did not hold a certificate of authorization required
by section 481.219 of the Florida Statutes.36 None of the principals of the
firm were registered architects. The architectural firm filed a claim of lien
for the amount of its fees. When the firm tried to enforce its lien and
maintain a breach of contract action, the prospective home owner argued
that because the firm was unlicensed it had no right to a lien nor to enforce
a contract for architectural services.37
The appellate court held that the architectural firm could maintain the
breach of contract action, although it was unlicensed, because there is an
exemption to the licensing requirement for the type of work performed
under section 481.229(1) of the Florida Statutes.38 No person is required
to qualify as an architect in order to make plans and specifications for single
32. Id. at 1065.
33. Id. at 1069.
34. 634 So. 2d 210 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
35. Id. at 211-12.
36. Id. at 211; see FLA. STAT. § 481.219 (1993).
37. Cantor, 634 So. 2d at 211.
38. Id. at 212; see FLA. STAT. § 481.229(l) (1993).
Vol. 19
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family residences. However, with respect to the construction lien claim, the
court held that section 713.03 of the Florida Statutes specifically limits the
right to claim a lien to "architects" authorized under chapter 481, or general
contractors who provide architectural services under design-build contracts
authorized by section 481.229(3). 3' This does not include those who
perform architectural services where no professional license is required.
Thus, the unlicensed architectural firm had no lien rights under the law.40
In Best Pool & Spa Service Co. v. Romanik,"' the court held that the
Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination applies not only to
criminal matters but also to administrative proceedings such as licensing.42
In Best Pool, a contractor was permitted to invoke the Fifth Amendment and
not respond to questions about his certifying to the county that there was
liability insurance.43 It is a crime to make false public records or certifi-
cates.44
B. Measure of Damages
In Mall v. Pawelski,45 the buyers of a seventeen-year old house
discovered, shortly after moving into the house, that the roof was leaking.
They replaced the entire roof and brought an action to recover their
expenses. The trial court awarded the buyers full cost of the new roof, even
though the roof which was replaced was as old as the house. The sellers of
the house appealed and the case came before the Fourth District Court of
Appeal.46
The appellate court agreed that the buyers were entitled to damages for
replacing the leaky roof, but the court disagreed as to the amount of those
damages. It reasoned that the buyers did not bargain for a new roof when
they bought a seventeen year old house. Allowing full recovery for a new
roof would unjustly enrich them. The proper measure of damages,
therefore, should be the replacement cost of the roof prorated to account for
39. Cantor, 634 So. 2d at 212; see FLA. STAT. § 481.229(3) (1993).
40. Cantor, 634 So. 2d at 212.
41. 622 So. 2d 65 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
42. Id. at 66; see also State ex reL Vining v. Florida Real Estate Comm'n, 281 So. 2d
487, 491 (Fla. 1973) (extending the right to remain silent to administrative proceedings which
"tend to degrade the individual's professional standing, professional reputation, or
livelihood").
43. Best Pool, 622 So. 2d at 66.
44. FLA. STAT. § 831.01 (1993).
45. 626 So. 2d 291 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
46. Id. at 291-92.
1994]
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the increased life expectancy of the new roof.47 Although this principle
was applied between a home buyer and seller, it would be equally applicable
in a construction defect case where a failed component was replaced after
an extended period of use.
It is incredible that there are multiple cases over several years dealing
with the measure of damages for recovery of a partially completed contract.
In Robinson v. Albanese,48 the Fifth District Court of Appeal addressed this
old issue and denied a contractor recovery based on insufficient evidence.49
There are two permissible measures of damages on behalf of a contractor
for a partially completed contract which is breached by the owner. The
contractor may recover the reasonable value of the labor performed and
materials furnished, or the contractor may recover the reasonable costs
incurred plus the lost profit under the contract.5
In Robinson, there was no evidence of the reasonable value of the work
when the contractor left the job.5 ' There was, likewise, no showing of
costs and lost profit. Accordingly, the judgment in favor of the contractor
was reversed. 2
C. Unjust Enrichment
In Hillman Construction Corp. v. Wainer,53 a general contractor hired
by a tenant of commercial premises to make improvements sued the landlord
of the rental property after the tenant failed to pay for those improvements
and later filed bankruptcy.5 4 The contractor argued that by allowing the
owner to reap the benefit of the improvements by renting the premises at in-
creased rent, the owner had been unjustly enriched. The trial court ruled
47. Id. at 292.
48. 636 So. 2d 831 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
49. Id. at 834.
50. Id.; see also Marshall Constr., Ltd. v. Coastal Sheet Metal & Roofing, Inc., 569 So.
2d 845 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1990).
"[T]he proper measure of damages in a breach of contract action by a
subcontractor against the contractor, where the contract has not been fully
performed, is either quantum meruit, or the subcontractor's lost profit in addition
to an amount representing the reasonable cost of labor and materials incurred in
good faith and in the partial performance of the contract."
Marshall Constr., 569 So. 2d at 847.
51. Robinson, 636 So. 2d at 834.
52. Id. at 835.
53. 636 So. 2d 576 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
54. Id. at 577.
Vol. 19
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that the contractor did not state a cause of action for unjust enrichment. The
Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, and opined that the complaint was
valid. 5
The appellate court stated the elements of unjust enrichment as: 1)
plaintiff has conferred a benefit on the defendant, who has knowledge
thereof; 2) defendant voluntarily accepts and retains the benefit conferred;
and 3) the circumstances are such that it would be inequitable for the
defendant to retain the benefit without paying the value thereof to the
plaintiff. 6 In this case, the court thought that the contractor had sufficient-
ly pleaded a claim for unjust enrichment. 7
In Maloney v. Therm Alum Industries,8 the Fourth District Court of
Appeal held that before pursuing an equitable claim against an owner with
whom the subcontractor did not have a contract, the subcontractor must first
exhaust his legal remedies against the contractor. 9 This case arose out of
a construction contract which provided that construction was to be
substantially completed no later than nine months from commencement.
Due to problems with ordering and installing materials, the certificate of
occupancy was issued nearly ten months late. In addition to these delays,
the owner claimed that the material was defective and therefore refused to
make final payment. The contractor and subcontractor filed claims 9 f lien.
The subcontractor sought to foreclose its lien and also sought damages
against the contractor. The contractor and subcontractor agreed to submit
their disputes with each other to arbitration. Meanwhile, the lender
foreclosed its mortgage and extinguished the construction liens. The
subcontractor then amended its complaint to add a claim against the owner
for equitable relief on the basis of unjust enrichment.6° A jury awarded the
subcontractor damages on its claim against the owner and the owner
appealed."
Under these circumstances, the appellate court questioned the award of
damages to the subcontractor against the owner. The subcontractor had no
contract with the owner. The court pointed out that the subcontractor was
entitled to receive payment from the contractor for work performed.
However, because the dispute between the contractor and subcontractor was
55. Id. at 578.
56. Id. at 577.
57. Id. at 577-78.
58. 636 So. 2d 767 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
59. Id. at 770.
60. Id.
61. Id.
1994]
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in arbitration, the court could not determine whether the subcontractor
would ultimately receive its payment from the contractor. Therefore, the
court disapproved the award against the owner and ruled that the subcon-
tractor could not show that there was no adequate legal remedy. 2 Absence
of an adequate legal remedy is an element of unjust enrichment against the
owner.
63
D. Negligence/Economic Loss Rule
In Brass v. NCR Corp.,64 the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida held that the economic loss rule does not bar
claims of fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation .0 The
court distinguished claims of fraud in the performance, which would be
barred by the rule, from claims of fraud in the inducement, which would not
be barred. 6 If the law were otherwise, the economic loss rule would have
the effect of abolishing the tort of fraud in the inducement altogether.67
In Southland Construction, Inc. v. Richeson Corp.,68 the Fifth District
Court of Appeal had an opportunity to discuss a key exception to the
economic loss rule,69 first discussed in A.R. Moyer, Inc. v. Graham,7"
when the Florida Supreme Court decided Casa Clara Condominium Ass 'n
v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc.7" The court retained an exception to this
doctrine for instances of negligence by a supervising architect,72 upholding
its earlier decision in A.R. Moyer.73
Southland Construction sued Richeson Corporation and Thomas E.
Richeson, individually, for breach of contract in the faulty design of a
retaining wall and for negligence. The trial court granted summary
judgment in favor of both defendants with respect to the negligence claim
62. Id.
63. Maloney, 636 So. 2d at 770.
64. 826 F. Supp. 1427 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
65. Id. at 1428.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. 642 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
69. Id. at 7.
70. 285 So. 2d 397 (Fla. 1973).
71. 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993).
72. Id. at 1247.
73. A.R. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 403.
Vol. 19
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based on the economic loss rule. Southland appealed this decision to the
Fifth District Court of Appeal.74
The appellate court reversed on the negligence claim, citing A.R.
Moyer.7 The court reasoned that Southland, as user of the plans, would
be injured if the designs were professionally below acceptable standards, and
caused damages. Richeson, as an individual professional, owed Southland
a duty to perform his professional duties in a professional, competent
manner. Thus, Moyer is authority for allowing a tort suit against Richeson,
individually, for professional malpractice.76
The appellate court, in Southland, however, did not rely only on the
Moyer exception to the economic loss rule, but noted that there was
evidence that other property had been damaged by the failure of the
retaining wall.77  The Moyer exception, while valid, is narrow. The
supreme court in Casa Clara strictly limited Moyer to the facts of a general
contractor damaged by a supervising architect.7"
In Tillman v. Howell,79 the Fourth District Court of Appeal held that
"one who breaches a contract is answerable only for damages that were or
reasonably should have been in the contemplation of the contracting
parties." One who is liable for the tort of negligence, on the other hand,
"must answer for all of the natural, direct, and proximate consequences of
his tortious conduct. . . ." These consequences generally include personal
injury and property damage, but not economic loss.8"
This case arose when the purchasers of a home refused to pay the
balance on a promissory note after they began to encounter problems which
they attributed to construction defects. The homeowners brought a breach
of contract claim after a faulty pipe caused a flood which damaged their
wood floors and cabinets. Additionally, they claimed damages for further
flooding when a carpenter, hired by the homeowners to repair the original
flood damage, put a nail through another water pipe. Additional damages
were incurred due to this flooding, and the homeowners sought compensa-
tion from the contractor. In support of this additional claim, the homeown-
74. Southland Constr. Inc., 642 So. 2d at 7.
75. Id.
76. See A.A. Moyer, 285 So. 2d at 403.
77. Southland Constr. Inc., 642 So. 2d at 9.
78. Id.; see Casa Clara, 620 So. 2d at 1246 (explaining the distinction between contract
law, which protects expectations, and tort law, in which the plaintiff must prove the duty
-owed by the other party).
79. 634 So. 2d 268 (Fla. 4th Dist. CL App. 1994).
80. Id. at 270.
1994]
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ers argued that the carpenter's negligence was foreseeable and that the
contractor was not absolved of liability because his conduct had set in
motion the chain of events which caused the second flooding and related
damage.8"
The court rejected the homeowner's arguments and reasoned that
actions in negligence are unlike actions based upon breach of contract. In
contract, the parties are limited to damages which "were or reasonably
should have been in [their] contemplation," at the time they made the
contract.12  The second flooding occurred due to "an unforeseeable
independent intervening cause," and, therefore, damages were not recover-
able under the contract for the carpenter's negligence.83
On September 8, 1994, the Florida Supreme Court decided Murthy v.
N. Sinha Corp.84 In that case, the court held that while there may be
negligence of a qualifying agent under principles of common law, there is
no statutory duty created by-sections 489.119 or 489.1195 of the Florida
Statutes which would support a private cause of action. 5
E. Products Liability
In Square D Co. v. Hayson,86 the court held that in products liability
cases, "[w]hen the manufacturer of an article involving an inherently
dangerous instrumentality (which includes electricity) places that product in
the stream of commerce, the manufacturer assumes the duty of conveying
to those who might use the product a fair and adequate warning of [the
products'] dangerous potentialities."87
VI. CONSTRUCTION LITIGATION
A. Settlement Agreements
In Crosby Forrest Products, Inc. v. Byers,8 the Fifth District Court
of Appeal held enforceable a stipulation agreement which provided that in
the event of a default, a stipulated sum in excess of the agreed settlement
81. Id. at 269.
82. Id. at 270.
83. Id. at 269.
84. 19 Fla. L. Weekly S429 (Sept. 8, 1994).
85. Id. at S430.
86. 621 So. 2d 1373 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
87. Id. at 1377.
88. 623 So. 2d 565 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
Vol. 19
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would become due. 9 While "[a] contract term which provides that a party
must pay a penalty for breaching a contract is unenforceable,"9 in this
case, the parties stipulated that a settlement amount was payable, but in the
event of default of payment of the settlement amount when agreed, the
higher amount related to the sum originally sought in the suit would be the
amount owed.9' The court reasoned that, where the larger amount payable
upon default represents a legitimate amount, courts may consider the parties'
right of freedom of contract as a basis for upholding the agreement to pay
the higher sum. 92
A per curiam decision in Suggs v. Defranco's, Inc.,93 held that where
a settlement letter left "a number of essential terms . . . open for future
negotiation[,]" there was no enforceable settlement agreement. 94 The letter
was only an agreement in concept.95
B. Condominiums
The Florida Supreme Court, in Rogers & Ford Construction Corp. v.
Carlandia Corp.,96 held that "a condominium unit owner [has] standing to
sue the developer or general contractor to recover damages for construction
defects or deficiencies in the common elements or common areas of the
condominium."97
C. Attorney's Fees
The United States Supreme Court, in Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.9'
considered the interpretation of the attorney's fee provision of the Copyright
Act of 1976, 9' which provides for the recovery of the prevailing party's
attorney's fees. The Court settled a split among the circuits, abolishing the
so-called "dual standard" of awarding fees, which treated plaintiffs. and
defendants differently.' Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that "[p]revailing
89. Id. at 567.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 568.
92. Id.
93. 626 So. 2d 1100 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
94. Id. at 1101.
95. Id. (citing Williams v. Ingram, 605 So. 2d 890, 894 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1992)).
96. 626 So. 2d 1350 (Fla. 1993).
97. Id. at 1351.
98. 114 S. Ct. 1023 (1994).
99. 17 U.S.C. § 505 (1976).
100. Fogerty, 114 S. Ct. at 1033.
1994]
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plaintiffs and prevailing defendants are to be treated alike [under § 505 of
the Copyright Act]," and that any award of attorney's fees is at the
discretion of the court. 01
In Heidle v. S & S Drywall & Tile, Inc., °2 a contractor sued a
homeowner to foreclose a construction lien for labor and materials provided
in the construction of her home. Heidle, the homeowner, filed an answer
and counterclaim alleging that the contractor's lien was fraudulent, and
sought damages and attorney's fees for discharging the lien.1
0 3
"[A] year passed [ ] with no action in the case, [and] Heidle moved to
dismiss the entire case for lack of prosecution pursuant to Florida Rule of
Civil Procedure 1.420(e)."'0 4 The complaint, answer, and counterclaim
were duly dismissed by the trial court, and Heidle sought attorney's fees
under section 713.29.
The trial court denied the homeowner's motion for attorney's fees,
citing the case of Stockman v. Downs, °5 which held that a claim for
attorney's fees, whether based on statute or contract, must be pled.0 6
Once the pleadings were dismissed, the court reasoned, the statute no longer
applied. Heidle appealed.
The appellate court reversed, and instructed the lower court to award
Heidle attorney's fees and costs.0 7 The court noted that the purpose for
requiring a claim for attorney's fees to be pled is to afford the opposing
party notice that attorney's fees would be sought.' In this case, S & S
received appropriate notice of the claim for attorney's fees in Heidle's
answer and counterclaim. Dismissing the suit for lack of prosecution did
not mean the claim was not made.
Where the statutory requirements of an offer ofjudgment are met under
section 768.69 of the Florida Statutes, an award of attorney's fees is
mandatory, unless the offer was not made in good faith.'0 9
101. Id.
102. 639 So. 2d 1105 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
103. Id. at 1105.
104. Id. at 1105-06; see FLA. R. Civ. P. 1420(e).
105. 573 So. 2d 835 (Fla. 1991).
106. Id. at 837.
107. Heidle, 639 So. 2d at 1106.
108. Id. (quoting Stockman, 573 So. 2d at 837).
109. Stunkel v. Hanley Landscape, Inc., 633 So. 2d 117 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994)
(citing Schmidt v. Fortner, 629 So. 2d 1036 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993)).
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D. Prejudgment Interest
In Interamerican Engineers & Constructors Corp. v. Palm Beach
County Housing Authority,"' the Fourth District found no error when the
trial court disallowed prejudgment interest in light of the law which holds
that "prejudgment interest is not absolute and may depend upon equitable
considerations.""'
E. Limitation of Actions
In the case of Stokes v. Huggins Construction Co.," 2 a property
owner built a new beach house. The house was placed on pilings. After the
house was built, the adjoining property owner excavated between six and
seven feet of soil from a portion of his property adjacent to the east side of
the new house. Sand and soil from the beach house lot then began to shift
into the excavation. The beach house contractor warned the property owner
of the dangerous condition, and recommended immediate action to prevent
major problems from occurring. The owner took no action. After a
summer storm, the beach house fell and was destroyed. More than four
years passed before the owner sued his neighbor and his neighbor's
excavating contractor. The neighbor and excavating contractor contend that
the claim is past the four year statute of limitations for negligence action,
and should therefore be barred."'
The issue for the First District Court of Appeal to decide was: when
does the limitation period begin to run in an action for negligent removal of
lateral support? Section 95.031 of the Florida Statutes states that "[a] cause
of action accrues when the last element constituting the cause of action
occurs."" 4 The neighbor and excavating contractor argued that the cause
of action accrued when the owner was put on notice of the problem by his
contractor. At that time the owner knew or should have known of the
negligent acts which caused the loss of lateral support." 5 The appellate
court disagreed. It reasoned that the beach house owners "did not have
knowledge of the permanency of their injury until their house fell down,
110. 629 So. 2d 879 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
111. Id. at 882 (citing Broward County v. Finlayson, 555 So. 2d 1211 (Fla. 1990)).
112. 626 So. 2d 327 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
113. Id. at 328.
114. FLA. STAT. § 95.031(1) (1993).
115. Stokes, 626 So. 2d at 329.
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even though they may have been on notice of probable or possible injury"
when their contractor informed them of the serious condition."
6
In Palm Beach County v. Savage Construction Corp., 7 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that an error in the naming of the surety in a
complaint was a misnomer which entitled the plaintiff to have its amended
complaint relate back to the date of original filing, thus avoiding the statute
of limitations defense."
8
In Wylie v. Investment Management & Research, Inc.,"9 the Fourth
District Court of Appeal held that "[n]onclaim statutes differ from statutes
of limitations in that the former are jurisdictional provisions which the
parties may not ordinarily waive, while the latter are procedural bars which
may be waived by the failure to plead or assert them.' 20
F. Expert Witnesses
There were several important decisions regarding the use of expert
witness testimony, beginning with the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. 1' The Court
held that the test for admissibility of expert scientific evidence established
in Frye v. United States2 2 was superseded by the adoption of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.'23 According to Frye, "expert opinion based on a
scientific technique is inadmissible unless the technique used is 'generally
accepted' as reliable in the relevant scientific community."'2 4 However,
nothing in the Federal Rules of Evidence governing expert testimony gives
any indication that "general acceptance" is a prerequisite to the admissibility
of scientific evidence.'25 Under the rules, a trial judge, faced with a
proffer of expert scientific testimony, must determine whether the expert is
proposing to testify to scientific knowledge that will assist the trier of fact
to understand or determine a fact in issue.
2 6
116. Id. at 330.
117. 627 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
118. Id. at 1333.
119. 629 So. 2d 898 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
120. Id. at 902.
121. 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993).
122. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
123. Daubert, 113 S. Ct. at 2793. Specifically, Rule 702 supersedes the "Frye Test."
Id.
124. Id. at 2792 (quoting Frye, 293 F. at 1014).
125. Id. at 2794.
126. Id. at 2796.
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In Square D Co.,'27 the First District held it was not an error to
permit the testimony of a mechanical engineer as to inadequate design, even
though the witness had no specific training in labels and warnings, and in
spite of the fact that he had not been qualified as an expert in electrical
power distribution equipment. 2 The court accepted the expert based on
his prior design experience.29
It has been determined that there must be "substantial competent
evidence of the [expert] services performed and the reasonable value of
those services," in order to recover expert witness fees as taxable costs in
state court. 3  In Powell v. Barnes,' a trial attorney, who was not
shown to have expertise in the same field as the expert whose fees were
sought to be taxed as costs, testified as to the expert witness fee. The court
determined that this was not substantial competent proof of the expert
witness fee. The court stated that the expert, or another qualified expert in
the same field, should provide the requisite proof.'
G. Piercing the Corporate Veil
In Walton v. Tomax Corp.,'33 the Fifth District Court of Appeal
reversed a directed verdict for the president and chief executive officer of
a construction corporation whom the homeowner claimed had acted as the
alter ego of the corporation. The court considered the factors discussed in
Dania Jai-Alai Palace, Inc. v. Sykes'34 and concluded that there was
enough evidence for the jury to find the construction company president
depleted corporate assets for his personal benefit so that the corporate veil
should be pierced. 5
127. Square D Co., 621 So. 2d at 1373.
128. Id. at 1379.
129. Id.
130. Powell v. Barnes, 629 So. 2d 185, 186 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (citing In re
Estate of Lopez, 410 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1982)).
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. 632 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
134. 450 So. 2d 1114 (Fla. 1984).
135. Walton, 632 So. 2d at 180-81.
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H. Class Actions
The Second District Court of Appeal in Barton-Malow Co. v.
Bauer'36 reversed an order granting class certification to parties who
claimed injury as a result of environmental problems within the Polk County
Courthouse. The plaintiffs claimed to have health problems caused by the
negligence of the building's general contractor and architect. The court held
that an evidentiary hearing, while not necessary in all cases, was necessary
here.
When it is not clear from the pleadings that common issues predominate
or that the proposed class representatives provide a superior method for
the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy .... If the defen-
dants contest the plaintiff s allegations, it will be necessary for the trial
court to determine whether the facts actually support the allegations.'"
VII. BANKRUPTCY
In In re American Ship Building Co., 3' a debtor sought to assume its
executory contract which the Department of the Navy had terminated. The
United States Bankruptcy Court of the Middle District of Florida held that
the bankruptcy court was without jurisdiction to determine the issue of
wrongful termination of the government contract. That issue is controlled
by the Contract Disputes Act, 139 and the Bankruptcy Court should yield
jurisdiction to the United States Court of Federal Claims. 4'
VIII. LIENS
A. Lien Priorities
In Carteret Savings Bank v. Citibank Mortgage Corp., the Florida
Supreme Court, on a certified question from the Fourth District Court of
Appeal, held "that only the portion- of a mortgage loan extended for the
purpose of purchasing property and existing improvements is entitled to
priority as a purchase money mortgage; priority in favor of a purchase
136. 627 So. 2d 1233 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
137. Id. at 1235.
138. 164 B.R. 358 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1994).
139. 41 U.S.C. §§ 601-613 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
140. American Ship, 164 B.R. at 362.
141. 632 So. 2d 599 (Fla. 1994).
Vol. 19
18
Nova Law Review, Vol. 19, Iss. 1 [1994], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol19/iss1/4
Leiby / Valdini
money mortgage does not extend to sums advanced for the improvement of
real property."'42
B. Notice to Owner
In 1992, the Florida Supreme Court held, in the case of Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co. v. Buck, 4 1 that where a common identity exists between the
owner and the contractor, privity of contract is established. Where privity
of contract with the owner exists, service of a Notice to Owner is not
required. 4 4 However, whether privity exists depends on the facts of each
case. In C.L. Whiteside & Associates Construction Co. v. Landings Joint
Venture,'45 the Fourth District Court of Appeal addressed the issue of
whether there was common identity between an owner and an ostensible
general contractor.
In Whiteside, the owner of the property was a joint venturer. The
managing partner of the joint venture was a corporation whose president
also happened to be the president of the construction company which
entered into the subcontract with Whiteside. The construction company
president personally signed the subcontract. The subcontractor did not serve
a notice to the owner relying on the fact that it dealt with the president of
the managing joint venture partner. Several months later, after a dispute
occurred between the general contractor and the subcontractor, the subcon-
tractor served its Notice to Owner. The subcontractor then suspended
performance and recorded a claim of lien. The trial court concluded that
there was not enough commonality of ownership between the owner and the
general contractor and dismissed the action to enforce the lien on summary
judgment due to lack of notice to the owner. The subcontractor appealed.
The Fourth District Court of Appeal agreed with the subcontractor that
"the issue of common identity is not synonymous with common ownership,"
for purposes of determining privity.'46 It reversed the summary judgment
and remanded the case for trial, noting that questions of privity will depend
on the facts of each case. Proof of common identity can establish
privity.147
142. Id. at 599 (emphasis omitted).
143. 594 So. 2d 280 (Fla. 1992).
144. Id. at 281.
145. 626 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
146. Id. at 1052.
147. Id. at 1053.
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The issue of when the forty-five days for serving a Notice to Owner
begins to run was addressed by the Fourth District Court of Appeal in
Gazebo Landscape Design, Inc. v. Bill Free Custom Homes, Inc.148
Gazebo, a landscaping contractor, sought to enforce a construction lien
against a homeowner. After traveling with the homeowner to a tree supplier
to choose specific trees in November and making a deposit for same,
Gazebo began digging holes on the owner's property for planting the trees
on December 5, 1990. Gazebo timely served its Notice to Owner, utilizing
the December 5th date, not the date of the November tree buying trip. The
trial court refused to enforce the lien on the grounds that Gazebo did not
serve its Notice to Owner within forty-five days after commencing to
furnish service or materials.
The appellate court disagreed with this interpretation and suggested that
the trial court look at all of the circumstances surrounding the particular job
or transaction in determining when the furnishing of services or materials
begins. While Gazebo did receive a deposit for the trees, the court
determined "there were no affirmative acts taken by Gazebo which establish
that Gazebo actually began to furnish materials" to the homeowner until it
dug the holes on the owner's property. Based upon the testimony of
Gazebo's representative, the Court determined it was reasonable to believe
that the trip to Sarasota was merely a sales trip, and that there was no deal
until "the job was in the ground."
The court pointed out that, for purposes of determining when materials
and services were furnished, the test which may be utilized is "whether the
contractor had actually suffered any economic detriment, or whether he
simply engaged in certain activities on a gratuitous basis, in hopes of
'landing' a job."' 9
C. Jurisdiction
Two district courts of appeal have held that proper jurisdiction for an
action to enforce a lien under $15,000 is the county court. 50 However,
the Florida Supreme Court recently determined that there is concurrent
jurisdiction in both the county and circuit courts for the enforcement of liens
not in excess of $15,000.'5' The court disagreed with the reasoning of the
148. 638 So. 2d 87 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1994).
149. Id. at 89.
150. Blackton, Inc. v. Young, 629 So. 2d 938 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1993); Brooks v.
Ocean Village Condominium Ass'n, 625 So. 2d 111 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1993).
151. Alexdex Corp. v. Nachon Enters., Inc., 641 So. 2d 858, 860 (Fla. 1994).
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Third District Court of Appeal when the lower court declared that an action
to enforce a lien does not involve title and boundaries to property. 5
2
D. Legislative Changes
There were a few changes to the construction lien law enacted by the
legislature in 1994, the most significant being a change to section 713.16,
with respect to requests for sworn statements of account.'53 In order for
the failure of the lienor to respond to the request to act as a complete
defense to the lien, the request for sworn statement must be served on the
lienor to the attention of the lienor's designee at the address specified in the
Notice to Owner. The change in the law does not make clear what happens
when the party serving the Notice to Owner does not designate a person or
address for service of the request for sworn statement in the Notice to
Owner.
The same is true for the request for sworn statement served by a
contractor on a job with an exemptory payment bond. 54 In order for the
failure to respond to the request to act as a defense to the bond claim, the
request for sworn statement must be served on the lienor to the attention of
the person designated in the preliminary notice, at the address designated.
If the owner, or the contractor on a job with a payment bond, serves
a request for sworn statement of account after having received a responsive
sworn statement of account, and if there has been no change in the
information between the time of giving of the sworn statement and the time
of the next request for sworn statement, then the failure to respond to the
second request for sworn statement does not act as a defense.'55
If a request for a sworn statement served after suit is filed to enforce
the lien, or after suit is filed to recover against a payment bond claim, that
request for sworn statement will not act as a defense.
Failing to furnish a response, or the furnishing of a false or fraudulent
statement, has always acted as a complete defense to the lien claim. After
July 1, 1994, the negligent inclusion or omission of any information in the
requested sworn statement will act as a defense to the extent that the owner
(or contractor with the payment bond) can demonstrate prejudice from the
negligent inclusion or omission.
152. Id.
153. See Act effective July 1, 1994, ch. 94-1 19, § 319, 1994 Fla. Laws 437, 633 (to be
codified at FLA. STAT. § 713.16).
154. FLA. STAT. § 713.23 (1993).
155. See ch. 94-119, § 319, 1994 Fla. Laws at 635.
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The warning at the top of the request for sworn statement has been
changed to add the words "signed under oath." There has been other
language added to the request which simply underscores the concept that the
response to the request for sworn statement is not required to include
information which is not known as to future work on the job. That was
already the state of the law.
IX. LEGISLATION AFFECTING CONTRACTORS
In response to the problems encountered in the aftermath of Hurricane
Andrew, the 1994 Florida Legislature created a statute dealing with
restrictions on the use a contractor may make of funds received in payment
for the repair, restoration, improvement, or construction of residential real
property during the term of an executive order or proclamation declaring an
emergency.5 6 This new law went into effect April 14, 1994.
There has been a Federal False Claims Act for many years.'57
However, in 1994, the Florida Legislature created the Florida False Claims
Act, '5 which provides a civil cause of action, including treble damages
for persons who present false claims, including any request or demand under
a contract for money, property, or services against the state.
X. CONCLUSION
This year saw several significant decisions effecting the construction
industry, most notably the recent Florida Supreme Court decisions in Murthy
and Nachon. Although two years have passed since Hurricane Andrew, its
effect on construction law continues to be felt from code changes and new
legislation concerning emergency management, to increased litigation
involving defective design and faulty construction. The consequences of
these many changes will undoubtedly find expression in the evolving case
law.
156. See Act effective Apr. 14, 1994, ch. 94-110, §§ 1-2, 1994 Fla. Laws 360, 360-62
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. § 252.361).
157. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3731 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
158. See Florida False Claims Act, ch. 94-316, §§ 1-17, 1994 Fla. Laws 2204, 2205-14
(to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 68.081-.092).
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